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JURISPRUDENCE:

A BEGINNER'S SIMPLE AND PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO ADVANCED AND COMPLEX LEGAL THEORY

Allen R. Kamp 1
INTRODUCTION

By now, if the first year curriculum, teaching method, and
subject matter-the entire culture of the first year of law schoolhas achieved its desired goal, you should be in a state of total
befuddlement.
Why the legal academy has chosen this strategy, these
tactics, and its ultimate goal is a good question, but I am not even
going to attempt to answer it. Rather my goal is to dispel a little of
the confusion by giving an introduction to jurisprudence, the part
of legal studies that attempts to construct a theory of law-what it
is, how it functions, and what it should be.2 Jurisprudence deals
with the history, philosophy, and sociology of the law. Legal
authorities-cases and statutes-are written and interpreted,
consciously or unconsciously, with the use of jurisprudential
concepts. Jurisprudence is a theoretical subject which can also
provide practical insights on how to read and understand these
legal authorities.
In the first year, we primarily study cases-the practice
known as "the case method." The common law is built on cases
rather than on code.3 We look to the past in order to find rules
and patterns that enable us to decide present disputes.
So how do we derive a system of law from a collection of
decisions? By assuming that all these decisions form a coherent
1Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School. B.A., University of California
(Berkeley), 1964; M.A., University of California (Irvine) 1967; J.D. University
of Chicago, 1969.
2 1 have tried to present the jurisprudential schools in their own terms. I, like
almost all law professors, have my own views. I see Formalism as mistaken, the
premise of Law and Economics wrong, and Neo-Textualism as hopelessly naive.
I consider myself to be working in the Legal Realism tradition. I have tried to
be fair to all. Please note that I intend my footnotes to serve more as references
for further reading than as authority.
3 Our system has become more and more dependent on statutes and
regulations. This development, however, is not emphasized (perhaps it would
be more precise to say it is ignored) in the first year of law school.
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pattern and, using various principles, read cases to form, discuss,
and apply that pattern. These principles include following past
precedent ("stare decisis"), reconciling and distinguishing cases,
deriving broad and narrow holdings, and interpreting cases on
various levels of abstraction.
One problem students have in understanding the assigned
cases is that the opinions seem both to come to different
conclusions (e.g., the necessity of consideration in order to have
an enforceable promise), and to treat similar fact situations in
totally different ways.4 Some knowledge of jurisprudence can help
us understand that the courts do take different approaches in
making decisions, and these varying approaches often reflect
particular jurisprudential views.
Duncan Kennedy describes a related concept called "legal
consciousness."5 He describes, and I attempt to set out below, the
ways in which judges, lawyers, and legal scholars have conceived
of the law and applied their conception in different eras:
The notion behind the concept of legal
consciousness is that people can have in common
something more influential than a checklist of facts,
techniques, and opinions. They can share premises
about the salient aspects of the legal order that are
so basic that actors rarely if ever bring them
consciously to mind. Yet everyone, including actors
who think they disagree profoundly about the
substantive issues that matter, would dismiss
without a second thought (perhaps as "not a legal
argument" or as "simply missing the point") an
approach appearing to deny them.
These underling premises concern the
historical background of the legal process, the
institutions involved in it, and the nature of the
intellectual constructs which lawyers, judges, and
4 Compare Alaska

Packers' Ass'n v. Dominico, 117 Fed. 99, 103 (9th. Cir. 1902)
(consideration necessary in exchange for modification) with Watkins & Son v.
Carrig, 21 A.2d 591, 592 (N.H. 1941) (no consideration necessary in exchange
for modification).
5 Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understandingof Legal
Consciousness: The Case of ClassicalLegal Thought in America, 185o-1940, 3
RES. IN L. AND SOC. 3, 4 (198o).
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commentators manipulate as they attempt to
convince their audiences. Among these premises,
there are often links creating subsystems with their
own internal organization and rules of operation.
These change with time. For example, they expand
and contract to cover-or not cover-a greater or
lesser number of the aspects of legal reality that are
6
within legal consciousness at a given time.
Before we begin, I offer a warning and a disclaimer.
Warning: You as a student can use jurisprudence to help you
understand the cases, but you cannot (if you want to pass) dodge
the basic student (indeed lawyer) work of case analysis, synthesis,
reconciliation and distinction. An answer to an essay question
that reads, "It depends on whether one takes a Formalist, Realist,
or Critical approach" will get a "huh" from the grading professor,
followed by an F and a recommendation that the student enroll in
a Ph.D. program. Disclaimer: This guide is necessarily simplistic.
Legal scholars have been debating the characteristics of these
jurisprudential schools incessantly and have written, at least,
thousands of law review articles about the issues raised within the
sub-discipline of the law called jurisprudence. What follows is a
rough and ready guide, mostly focusing on the private law subject
matter which forms the core of the first year curriculum.
FORMALISM

A Langdell student who was presented with a
case-a case, for example, in which a landlord moves
to evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent and the
tenant replies that there has been no heat in the
building for two years-was expected to find the
doctrine that would logically decide it. According to
the doctrine of Caveat Lessee, for instance, a
contract between a landlord and a tenant promises
nothing beyond which is specifically written into it:
if there is no undertaking on the part of the landlord
to keep the building heated, he isn't obligated to do
so. Case closed: the tenant's on the street.7

6

1d. at 6.

7 This and the following introductory sections are taken from Calvin Trillin, A
Reporter atLarge: HarvardLaw, NEW YORKER, Mar. 26, 1984, at 53.
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We start with Formalism, a.k.a., Classical Legal Doctrine,
the dominant jurisprudence of the last half of the Nineteenth
Century up to the New Deal.8 There are some problems with our
use of this term. First, the Formalists did not call themselves
"Formalists." The term was coined by the successor movement,
Legal Realism. It is said, history is written by the victors, and
most of the descriptions of Formalism have been written by the
Realists who supplanted that approach to law.9 Basic principles of
Formalism include:
* Law is elevated above politics by society's commitment to
universal principle.1°
* Legal principles are "neutral," not a product of choice
between political interests or policies." Any doctrine can
be understood on its own terms; it is free-standing and selfsufficient and has its own moral justification and inner
logic.12 Thus, a few basic principles generate a logical
system of rules.
* Judicial decisions should follow rules uncontroversially,
without the need to choose between alternatives, when they
are applied to readily ascertainable facts.13
* Very abstract propositions control entire bodies of law.14

8 This

date and all the dates given for the various jurisprudential schools are

approximate; there is much debate over the beginning and ending dates of all
these schools of thought. My dates will, however, give the reader a rough idea
of when the school had its dominant influence. Duncan Kennedy describes the
dates roughly as follows: "Pre-Classical legal thought flourished between 18oo
and 186o and declined between 186o and 1885. Classical legal thought
emerged between 185o and 1885, flourished between 1885 and 1935, but was in
rapid decline by 1940. Modern legal thought emerged between 19oo and 1930
and survives to this day." Kennedy, supra note 5, at 23.
9 "[N]one of the scholars who were later dubbed formalists seemed to have

called himself a formalist or, for that matter, really thought there was a
movement either to defend or to repudiate." ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL
POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE §3.2, 57 (1988)
Fearof Contract,2004 Wis. L. REV. 429, 441 (2004)).
10

(citing Roy Kreitner,

Kennedy, supra note 5, at 12

11Id.

12 Jeffrey M. Blum, CriticalLegal Studies and the Rule of Law, 38 BUFF. L.
REV. 59, 116-17 (1990).

13 Thus, Classical Legal Thought sought objective tests, not the standards
favored by the Legal Realists. See discussion below, under Part V: Rules and
Standards, and Thomas C. Grey's, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1,
11 (1983).

14 See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 21.
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Christopher Columbus Langdell, Dean of Harvard Law
School, who invented and applied the Socratic case method in the
187Os, was the archetypical Formalist. He saw the law as a
science, with its first principles derived from case law, and then
with particular rules derived from these first principles. These
rules were seen to be coherent and consistent. Law was about
these principled rules and their application, not about public
policy, trade practices, wealth maximization, or the expectation of
the parties.15
Law was thought of as a science, a science akin to geometry,
in which basic axioms generate answers to specific problems. This
view again explains the irrelevance of policy - a triangle's angles
total 180 ° whether it should morally or not, and whether social
utility could be maximized by a different total is a nonsensical
question. 16 A Formalist believes that all controversies can be
deduced by reference to the demands of a rather short list of
principles.17 "[T]he working rules or operating procedures of the
legal system should themselves be easily mechanically applied to
raw facts without the need to rely on a great deal of subtle
judgment, with only open-textured standards to guide the
decision maker (for example a rule to enforce only 'reasonable'
contracts)." 18 "Formalism in this sense is the theory that all
questions of law can be resolved by deduction, that is, without
resort to policy, except for questions arising under rules that
explicitly require policy argument."19
We can see this philosophy at work in the answer to the
"mailbox problem," i.e., is a contract formed when a formal
written acceptance is put into a mailbox (as established by the
"mailbox rule"), or when it is read by the offeror? To Langdell,
fundamental contract doctrine clearly dictated that the acceptance
had to be received by the offeror. A binding contract needs
consideration. The consideration for the offeror's promise is the
offeree's return promise, which becomes effective only when
communicated. Thus the mailbox rule had to be wrong. Langdell
answered the arguments that the mailbox rule served justice and

15 Grey, supra note 13, at 2.
16

Id. at

16-20.

17 MARK KELMAN,
18

A GUIDE

TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 11

(1987).

Id.

19DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIECLE 105 (1997).
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the interests of the parties by stating that these arguments were
irrelevant because law is a product of logic, not policy.20

Examples of Formalist categories include "business affected
with the public interest" and thus subject to regulation, as
opposed to businesses not so affected and thus not subject;
legislation that interfered with contract rights (bad), in contrast
with legislation affecting remedies (okay); and the distinction
between exercise of the police power (okay) and confiscation
(bad).21 In the civil procedure area, a person was either present in
a state and thus subject to its jurisdiction or outside of it and thus
not so subject.22
Contract cases that are Formalistic include Hamer v.
Sidway23 and Strong v. Sheffield.24 In Hamer, an uncle promised
his nephew $5,000 if he would give up liquor, tobacco, swearing,
and playing cards or billiards. The case was decided on the issue
of whether there was consideration or not. The court ruled that
there was consideration and thus a contract because the nephew
had given up a legal right. In contrast, Strong v. Sheffield held
that a guarantor's indorsement on a note could not be enforced
because there was no consideration. In both cases, what was left
out of the opinions may be more important than what was
included.
In both, the question was whether there was
consideration: if the requirements for consideration were met,
there was a contract; if not, there was not. Neither decision
explored whether or not agreements with nephews to have a
moral life are a good idea, or whether some indorsements on
negotiable instruments should or should not be enforced as a
matter of commercial policy.
That a judge deciding a case under Formalistic doctrine
could reach a very undesirable decision was a necessary result of
Formalism's premises. "For example the Statute of Frauds was
intended to prevent the manufacture of evidence, but occasionally
works as an escape hatch for a shady operator dealing with a legal
neophyte."25 The parol evidence rule can also work injustice. In
20

See Grey, supra note 13, at 4.
18.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
Strong v. Sheffield, 39 N.E. 330 (N.Y. 1895).
Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 359 (1973) (citing

21 1d. at
22
23

24
25

Bourke v. Callanan, 35 N.E. 460, 461 (Mass. 1893) ("We are aware by our
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Gianni v. R. Russell & Co. Inc.,26 the owner of a small shop in an
office building wanted to keep out a competitor. He claimed that,
in return for not selling any tobacco, he had been promised that
he would have no competition. The court, however, excluded any
evidence of that promise because of the Formalistic parol evidence
rule. With a little imagination and reading between the lines, one
can see Gianni as an Italian immigrant unable to read English and
struggling to make a living operating a small shop in an office
building. He was prohibited from selling tobacco products, which
would have been a substantial portion of his sales, but the lessor
assured him that he would be the only concessionaire in the
building. The court, however, refused to even consider such
assurance, because the parol evidence rule restricted the
agreement to the terms of the formal writing. Even though
Gianni's story may well have been true and he may have been
unfairly treated, the court purposefully ignored his story and his
claim of injustice.
Anomalies
In order to fulfill the Formalistic program to achieve
general, systematic, and abstract legal doctrine, judges and
scholars had to separate out and classify as anomalies areas of the
law such as insurance and quasi-contract that could not be made
to fit into the Formalistic system. 27 We see such a process at work
in Cotnam v. Wisdom,28 where the court awarded compensation
to a physician who had helped an unconscious accident victim.
Since the victim was unconscious, no contract could have been
made, but the court nonetheless found liability under the doctrine
of "quasi-contract." The court took great pains to emphasize that
a quasi-contract was not a real contract, but a fiction. "A contract
implied by law, on the contrary, rests upon no evidence. It has no
actual existence. It is simply a mythical creation of the law."29
The court again stressed the doctrine "[i]s not good logic ... not
true ... it is a legal fiction," concluding "[i]f it were true, it would

not be a fiction."30
construction... the statute of frauds may be made an instrument of fraud. But

that always is true, whenever the law prescribes a forum for an obligation.").
Gianni v. R. Russell & Co. Inc., 126 A. 791 (Pa. 1924).
7 MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 15
(1992).
26
2

Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164 (Ark. 1907).
Id. at 165.
30 Id. at 165-166.
28
29
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Quasi-contract presented a problem to a Formalistic court.
A regular contract rests on facts from which the court could infer a
mutual understanding: "[a]n actual contract ...that is an actual
meeting of the minds of the parties, an actual, mutual
understanding," while a quasi-contract presented the court with
the task of doing justice without formal guideposts. Hence, seeing
the situation of "quasi-contract" as an anomaly enabled the courts
to both have a formal system of contracts and give relief outside of
that system.
THE AT[ACK ON FORMALISM

The Classical Legal System, however, began to break down
and then found itself subject to unrelenting attack, starting in the
late nineteenth century and continuing through the early twentieth
century. Following Horwitz, we could call this (and thus link-up
the attack with the political and social movement termed
Progressivism) the challenge of "Progressive Legal Thought."31
Scholars and judges came to the conclusion that there was
no such thing as a value-free legal decision, and thus courts had to
consider policy. Examples included the creation of two new legal
doctrines: the right to privacy and promissory estoppel. Brandeis
created the right to privacy out of neglected precedent. Like the
Classicists, he founded the right on a general principle, but he
justified his conclusion on policy and changed social conditions.32
Promissory estoppel was also created by reexamining older,
neglected cases and discovering a principle that provided relief in
situations where it seemed that justice required compensation. It
was later adopted by the Restatement. But of course, the doctrine
based liability on reliance, rather than on agreement and
consideration, and thus totally conflicted with Classical contract
doctrine. 33 Grant Gilmore went so far as to announce The Death
of Contract.34 Moreover, once policy was considered, the Formal
system broke down. "[The judge] must never ask whether giving
this particular response, in light of the total situation including
31 HORWITZ, supra note 27, at 4.

32 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890); see Grey, supra note 13, at 31-32.

33 See Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S. W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (in which a
gratuitous promise to pay a pension could not be enforced as a contract, but
could be under reliance doctrine).
34 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
HeinOnline -- 2 Crit 69 2009

but not limited to the per se elements, is best. The minute he
begins to look over his shoulder at the consequences of responding
to the presence or absence of the per se elements he has moved
some distance toward substantively rational decision."35
Professor Horwitz maintains that the essential difference
between nineteenth century and twentieth century American
thought was that the former thought in bright line categories,
while the later thought in terms of a continuum between
contradictory policies and doctrines.36 We may see this "decategorization" at work in two famous contract opinions by Justice
Cardozo:
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon37 and Jacob &
Youngs, Inc. v. Kent.38 In Wood, Cardozo found consideration
present in the form of Wood's implied duty to use good faith in
marketing Lady Duff-Gordon's designs.
Read literally, the
contract did not require Wood to do anything; but Cordozo did
not consider that the end of the matter. Rather, he saw the
implication of such a promise to be a rejection of Formalism, "a
punitive formalism" at that. "The law has outgrown its primitive
stage of formalism when the precise word was the sovereign
talisman, and every slip was fatal. It takes a broader view today.
A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be
'instinct with an obligation,' imperfectly expressed .... If that is
so, there is a contract."39 Thus, the court read an obligation of
good faith regarding the marketing of the license into the contract,
even though there was no explicit provision of any such obligation.
In Jacob & Youngs, the defendant refused to make the final
payment to the contractor who had built his house because the
pipe the contractor installed was not made by a specific
manufacturer, as specified by the contract, although pipe of
equivalent quality (although made by another manufacturer) had
been used. Cardozo held that the owner was to receive the
difference in value between the promised pipe and the delivered
pipe (which was minimal), rather than the cost of having the walls
torn down and the pipe he had contracted for installed. In
deciding the case, Cardozo rejected bright line categorical
thinking:
Kennedy, supra note 25, at 359.
HORWITZ, supra note 27, at 17.
37 Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
38 Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239 (N.Y. 1921).
39 Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. at 214.
35

36

HeinOnline -- 2 Crit 70 2009

Those who think more of symmetry and logic in the
development of legal rules than of practical
adaptation to the attainment of a just result will be
troubled by a classification where the lines are so
wavering and blurred. Something, doubtless, may
be said on the score of consistency and certainty in
favor of a stricter standard.
The courts have
balanced such considerations against those of equity
and fairness, and found the latter to be the
weightier.40
LEGAL REALISM

According to Legal Realism, cases are decided
within the context of the society's cultural and
economic and political values, and the law changes
when the context changes-when, for instance, the
society as a whole begins to worry a little more about
protecting the tenant and a little less about
protecting the landlord.... In 1970, Judge Skelly
Wright, of the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia Circuit, held that the contract between
landlord and tenant contained an implied warranty
that the premises were habitable.41
We now come to a school of jurisprudence, Legal Realism,
which had its heyday between World Wars I and II, was
enormously influential, and whose principles (some would say,
lack of principles) still inform much of today's law.
The nature of the movement (and even whether or not it
was a movement) is still a matter of debate today. At issue are
such basic questions as whether it was an outgrowth of
Progressivism or a break with it, its relation to the New Deal, and
whether it died out in the late 1940S 42 or became the dominant
mode of contemporary legal thought.
In investigating the
doctrine, one immediately comes across Karl Llewellyn, who

40

Jacob & Youngs, 230 N.Y. at 242-43.

41

Trillin, supra note 7, at 55.
Someone said it simply "disappeared like water poured into sand..." But

42

someone else said ". . . we are all Realists now.

.

." See John Henry Schlegel,

Drawing Back from the Abyss, or Lessons Learned from Count von Count, 1
CRIT 16, 17 (2008).
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invented the term43 and was the chief drafter of the Uniform

Commercial Code. But how typical of the movement was he? And
what were the defining characteristics of the movement? I have
spent too much time reading books and reading and writing
articles debating these questions, and they do not reach a
conclusion.
My own take is that Legal Realism was a movement of a
group of quasi-radical, elite legal academics, located primarily at
Harvard, Yale, and Columbia, who shared a set of working
assumptions. I do not see these assumptions as being a set of
consistent philosophical axioms, but rather as a shared way of
looking at the law and contemporary social and legal problems.
Most of the following assumptions were shared by of the Realists:
* The law should be congruent with social policy; it should
promote fairness, efficiency, and prosperity.
* Lawyers are the architects of society and their work should
reflect the values and goals of their society as the law
accommodates the needs of social and economic groups.
* Society evolves, and the law must evolve with it. The
Realists thus saw the need to clear away older concepts
they saw as legal debris. These outmoded concepts were
such abstract concepts of Formalism as the absolute
necessity of consideration, privity of warranty, formal offer
and acceptance, and the mirror image rule.
" As befits the term "Realism," "the law should be based on
fact, factual investigation, and actual practices rather than
an abstract theory. The law should be judged on how it
works, not its theoretical consistency."44
* Rules of law should be tailored (and limited) to specific
situations. The more general the law, the worse it is.
This list could go on and on, but you can see that the Legal
Realists rejected the first principles of Formalism. They were
successful in demolishing the edifice of the Classical Legal System.
See Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean
Pound,44 HARV. L. REv. 1222 (1931) (serving as the manifesto of Legal
Realism).
44 This pragmatic approach was later taken up by the Law and Economics
movement, which is discussed below. Although politically Legal Realism was
aligned with the New Deal and Law and Economics is with Neo-conservatism,
both focus on pragmatic results rather than on constructing elegant theory.
43
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The Arch-Realist was Karl Llewellyn, and his chief Realist
masterpiece was the Uniform Commercial Code. Llewellyn and
his colleagues' original vision was changed by the political process
of enacting the UCC, and much of today's Code in fact contradicts
the premises of Realism, but the Code remains its primary and
most important achievement.45 The Code's influence extends
beyond commercial law to contract law in general and to ways of
looking at all law. As stated by Grant Gilmore, the drafter of
Article 9 of the UCC, "Llewellyn had recruited a drafting staff
which was composed mostly of younger law professors whose own
ideas about the law had been greatly influenced by Llewellyn and
the other Realists. "Sharing Llewellyn's views, they produced
drafts which reflected his own pluralism and anticonceptualism."46 The Code was written to build on and improve
the common law by clearing away "debris from the field so that
commercial law would follow the natural flow of commerce."47 It
generally rejects any Formalistic rule system; instead it identifies
the relevant and important elements that point the way to a
solution.
We can see this rejection of Formal concepts in both Article
and Article 9. Prior sales law had used "title" to determine
issues such as risk of loss. For example in the "English haystack
case," the buyer bought a haystack but delayed moving it. When
the haystack burned up soon thereafter, the court put the risk on
the buyer because title had passed.48 The Realist's Article 2
rejected this reliance on title as metaphysical: "The purpose is to
avoid making practical issues between practical men turn upon
2

the location of an intangible something [title] ...and to substitute

for such abstractions proof of words and actions of a tangible
character."49 Pre-Code, security interests in personal property5O
were extremely complicated, and many different security devices
Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A History of the Uniform Commercial
Code 1949-1954, 49 BUFF. L. REv. 359 (2001) (I discuss the UCC at length
45

because I am familiar with it and because it is a significant, if not the most
significant contribution of the Realists to today's law).
46

GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 85-86 (1977).

Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudenceof the Uniform
Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 631 (1975).
48 Tarling v. Baxter, 1o8 Eng.Rep. 484 (1827) (note that the court did not
discuss who was better able to have the stack insured or protect against the
loss).
47

49 U.C.C. § 2-101, cmt. (2004).

An example would be a buyer's granting an interest in a car to secure
payment.
50
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were required for particular secured transactions. The concept of
"title" had been used to determine who had what security interest.
With the UCC, the Realists completely threw out all the old
security devices and created an entirely new vocabulary to
describe such interests.
In interpreting contracts, Article 2 concentrates on such
facts as how prior and present contracts have been performed by
the parties, and what practices are normal in the business the
parties are in. Thus, Article 2 depends on a close analysis of facts
to determine issues. For example, Section 2-508(2) involves five
factual issues in determining a seller's right to cure a defective
tender of goods: (1) is the rejected tender non-conforming, (2) did
the seller have reasonable grounds to believe it was acceptable, (3)
did the seller reasonably notify the buyer, (4) did the seller
substitute a "conforming tender," and (5) did he do so in a
"reasonable time"? The judge or jury has to determine all these
facts to decide the issue.
Hence, Article 2 does its best to demolish Classical Contract
Doctrine. The 1941 Draft contained many sections that discarded
Formalism, such as dropping title as a deciding factor, providing
that a contract may be made in any manner, and limiting the
scope of the statute of frauds. Similarly, under Article 2 the
question of whether contract formation has occurred depend upon
the doctrine of offer and acceptance, but rather "whether the
parties, as a matter of fact, have rendered a business agreement to
buy and sell goods."51 The Code also rejects the doctrine of
"definiteness," which held all significant terms had to be agreed
upon for there to be a contract. Consideration is downgraded, and
both firm offers and modification are permitted without it.
Further, there is no requirement that the exact moment of
contract creation be determined.
Article Two's assault on
traditional doctrine drew protests from the defenders of the old
order. Hiram Thomas, a practicing attorney who was one of the
Code's drafters, complained that "Undue emphasis or stress is
given to what might be called the variations or exceptions or
limitations to fundamental contract rules ... [t]he emphasis is not
on the contracts as written, but on the variation."52

51

Revised Unif Sales Act, § 3-A (1) (1941) (draft alternative).

52

Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform CommercialCode:

1940-49, 51 SMU L. REV. 275, 290 (1998).
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Cases decided under the UCC often apply the realist
mindset in deciding the issues. In Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v.
Royster Co.,53 the court allowed contractual language, which

stated that the seller must sell a minimum of 31,000 tons of
phosphate a year, to be interpreted to as a mere projection of
tonnage required to be sold that could be adjusted in response to
changing circumstances. This reasoning is a notorious example of
a court citing trade usage to allow variable contractual language.
In that case, the court focused on what the parties had done and
what the usage of the trade was rather than on the language of the
contract.
Another example is Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co.54 In

that case, the court emphasized the real needs of the buyer
(including the need for an assured supply of propane for supplying
residential subdivisions), rather than Formalistic rules such as
"mutuality" when it decided to grant the buyers specific
performance. A sub-issue in Laclede also illustrates the Code's
approach to contract formation. The propane supplier tried to get
out of the contract, claiming the contract was indefinite. The
court held that even though the contract did not explicitly contain
definite terms of duration, the contract in fact could be expected
to terminate in ten or fifteen years, because the buyer's customers
would convert to natural gas and stop using propane within that
time period.
Procedural law has also become more factually based. For
example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, promulgated in
1938, provide for wide-ranging discovery, using devices such as
depositions, interrogatories, and document production requests in
order to demonstrate the factual basis of every case.55 Also,
consider the holding in Pennoyer v. Neff,56 where presence clearly
determined jurisdiction, in contrast with the approach of the court
in International Shoe v. Washington57 which used the multifactored minimum contacts test and based its holding on the
actual relationship between the defendant and the jurisdiction.
Since many of the tenets of Realism are now generally
accepted, those tenets influence modern case law. Justice Rodger
F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971).
54 Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co.,
53 451

522 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975).
R. CIV. P. 26-37.
56 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
57 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
55 FED.
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Traynor, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California, applied
the teachings of Legal Realism in his many path-breaking
decisions. For example, in Pacific Gas v. G.W. Thomas Drayage,
Justice Traynor wrote an opinion in which he severely limited the
scope of the parol evidence rule,58 by focusing instead on what the
parties actually meant. He reasoned that in order to ascertain the
parties' intent "rational interpretation requires at least a
preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove
the intention of the parties."59
RULES AND STANDARDS

Although not strictly schools of jurisprudence, the
proponents of rules and those of standards each have a different
view of the law. Much of the difference between judicial opinions
and statutes depends on whether a "rules" or "standards"
approach is used. There is a fierce debate between rulesproponents and standards-proponents.
For some reason,
conservatives like rules, (for example, Justice Scalia is a strong
proponent of rules). 60 Standards are associated with the left - the
Legal Realists wanted to replace the rules of Formalism with
standards and largely did so in the Uniform Commercial Code. 61
Examples of "rules" include laws based on a person
attaining a certain age, such as the age of majority in order to
contract and the age of eligibility to receive Social Security. One
immediately sees the virtue and the vice of such rules: the virtue
is that they are easy to administer - one is, or is not, eighteen or
over; the vice is that such rules are both under and over inclusive.
Many people are mature enough to weigh the consequences of
entering into a contract at age 17, while others are not at age 18.
Some are aged at 64 and should qualify for Social Security,
whereas some who are 69 are perfectly healthy and able to work.
Standards have the opposite virtues and vices; properly
administered they will precisely fit the situation, but such
administration is much more costly. Thus, rules and standards
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641
(Cal. 1968).
59 Id. at 639-40.
6
oAntonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989).
61 The association is only a loose one (the left likes some rules, the right some
standards), but this seems to be the general preference.
58
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present us with a dilemma: we want the benefits of both, but we
have to choose one or the other. Business people, for example,
want clear rules so they know where they stand and what is
allowed and prohibited. But they also want the administrative
flexibility that goes with standards.
Examining "A safety compliance officer's guide to facial
hair," an article in FINANCIAL TIMES by John Kay, 62 provides a
useful example. The problem is that "[i]f you work in a dusty
environment, you should wear a respirator and insure that your
beard does not get in the way."6 3 But how do you define 'beard'?"
Here the U.S. and Britain take different approaches - we use rules
- the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
prohibits facial hair with detail and cross-references - while the
British use standards - it simply imposes "on employers an
obligation to ensure health and safety .... "64 Some argue that the
U.S.'s approach merely "invite[s] businesses to comply with the
rules rather than ensure a safe and healthy working
environment." 6 5 Yet others counter that the U.K's common sense
rule has its faults: common sense is not universally common, it
may lead to over-compliance because there is no safe harbor, and
no one is sure as to what exactly should be done. 66 Thus, while
there is a demand for clearer, more definite rules, businesses also
want sensitivity to particular circumstances and resent detailed
prescription. 6 7 Regulators thus "tread a fine line between detailed
prescription and inchoate principle, they must constantly listen to
people who say "the government should do something about that"
68
and to people - often the same people - who deplore red tape."

62

John Kay, A Safety Compliance Officer's Guide to FacialHair, FINANCIAL

TIMES,

May 22, 2007, at 15, available at http://www.johnkay.com/business/

498.
631d.
6

41d.

651d.
66

1d.

671d.
68Id.
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We can list the good and the bad things of both
6
approaches. 9
Rules:
The Bad
" Rules are underinclusive as to purpose, overinclusive as to
purpose, or both. This attribute of rules is a staple
complaint against the law made by popular culture. It
seems that every day newspapers have stories of how the
law is being applied in an unfair way. In fact, the very day I
was revising this section, I tested my theory by looking at
the Chicago Tribune. Sure enough, in the Business section
was the article "Federal rules wreak havoc on condominium
sales," complaining that the FHA rule that wreaks "the
most havoc locally.., is the one requiring a condo building
to have four or more units."70
* Rules enable a person to "walk the line," i.e., to use the
rules to one's own advantage, which may be counter to the
rules' purpose. We have an intuitive sense of how to do
this, my oldest granddaughter (at age 3), for example, was
faced by a rule that she had to be "done" with her dinner in
order to eat dessert; she ate four peas and announced
"done."
* Rules will always have gaps and conflicts that breed
litigation. Parol evidence, for example, is and was a goal of
classical contract law. It excludes consideration of many
claimed agreements that are not incorporated into the final
writing.
* Rules lead to unfair results, as in Gianni.71 Because they
lead to unfair results, judges manipulate them to achieve
justice. Thus, Rules' virtue of predictability may be more
apparent than real. Rules breed complexity. Try writing
out, for example, the parol evidence rule, with its
exceptions and provisions. You will have at least one page.

69

The following is mostly taken from MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL

40-63 (1987) (Prof. Kelman concludes by explaining "Why
Rules and Standards Are Both No Good").
LEGAL STUDIES,

Mary Ellen Podmolik, FederalRules Wreak Havoc on Condo Sales, CHI.
TRIB., July 30, 2008 at 1, available at http://archives.chicagotribune.com.
71 Gianni, supra,note 26.
70
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The Good
* Rules are clear. Thus they are (1) easy to apply, and (2)
citizens can easily conform their behavior to them and
remain safe from liability.
* Rules control judges. Justice Scalia justifies his love of
rules on his conviction that the alternative is the
substitution of a judge's own whims and personal
preferences for the law.
* Rules constitute the law and make it a separate, discrete
endeavor. If the law were to consist only of morals and
ethics, it would not be law, but something else.72
Standards
The Good and the Bad of Standards mirror that of Rules:
The Bad
* Standards are unpredictable and therefore bad for
planning. Suppose, for example, that a client asks your
advice on whether he can revoke acceptance of a good.
Factors to be considered under UCC Section 2-608 include:
* Whether the nonconformity substantially impairs the
value of the good to the buyer;
* Whether the buyer accepted the good
* on the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would be cured and
* it has not been cured or
* Without discovery of the nonconformity if
* the discovery was difficult or
* if the acceptance was reasonably induced by the
seller's assurances.
Also, revocation must occur:
* Within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or
should have discovered it, and
* Before any substantial change in condition of the goods
which is not caused by their own defects.
72 STANLEY FISH, The Law Wishes to Have a FormalExistence in THE STANLEY
FISH READER 165 (H. Aram Veeser Ed. 1999).
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The Section goes on to deal with the buyer's rights and
effect of the buyer's use of the goods. Hence, any advice
you would give is clear at the extremes, but there is a large
grey area.
* Standards are expensive to litigate. Because they are fact
dependent, they require extensive discovery and
presentation of evidence. Again, examine the question of
whether or not a contract existed: under the Formal
System, one simply looked to see if there was an offer, an
acceptance mirroring the offer, and consideration. If so,
there was a contract. Under Article 2, on the other hand,
there may be many complex factual issues. If "conduct by
the parties"73 may constitute a contract, then the parties
must find and present evidence of that conduct, using
expensive and time-consuming discovery. Standards may
not give rise to personal anarchy on the part of judges, as
Justice Scalia fears, but they do give judges wide discretion
in deciding cases. The Legal Realists trusted judges to do
the right thing and therefore thought such discretion to be
a good thing; others with a less favorable view of the
judiciary may disagree. "Standards are bad because they
are subject to arbitrary and/or prejudiced enforcement."74
The Good
Standards are not (or at least they should not be) over-or
under-inclusive; they should provide more exact justice.
For example, the Realists argued that the Formalist rule
that prevented modifications of contracts without
consideration
worked
against
making
necessary
accommodations to changing circumstances. The Realists
also
claimed
that judges
actually manipulated
consideration
doctrine
to
police
modifications.
Modifications "may be binding if the judge can find an
implied rescission of the old contract and the formation of
a new one. . . . The realists taught us to see this
arrangement as a smokescreen hiding the skillful judge's
decision as to duress in the process of renegotiation, and as
source of confusion and bad law when skill was lacking."75
73 U.C.C.
74

§ 2-204(1) (2004).

Kelman, supra,note 17, at 41.

Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1700 (1976).
75
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The UCC and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts state
that consideration is not necessary, but that modifications
have to be made in good faith. The rules of the UCC and
the Restatement should work to allow good faith justifiable
modification and invalidate bad faith ones.
* Standards may be more efficient. A contracting party is
better off if he can rely on the good faith behavior of the
opposite party rather than on a lengthy, detailed writing
that is both costly to draft and interpret.
* Standards avoid the bad things about rules: they prevent
"gaming the system," they explicitly allow considerations of
justice and they are simpler than many complex systems of
legal rules.
The Rules/Standards dilemma is exemplified by Kiefer v.
FredHowe Motors.76 There a working husband and father bought
a car just before his twenty-first birthday.77 He returned the car
and sued to recover what he paid. He was successful in rescinding
the transaction because he had been a minor at the time the
contract arose. The court noted that California and New York
8
allow for submitting a contract to court to determine its fairness,7
and that such a procedure should police parties who exploit
minors' immaturity while allowing fair deals to be enforced. It
also noted that enforcing a rule which invalidates all of a minor's
contracts for non-necessaries invalidates many perfectly proper
transactions while failing to protect the immature twenty-one year
old. Yet the Kiefer court rejected the other jurisdictions' standard,
and applied the rigid rule, because the standard-approach
"appears to be extremely impractical in light of the expense and
delay that would necessarily accompany the procedure."79
Further, the Kiefer court argued, it did not change the rule on
minor's capacity to contract because the appellant had addressed
the wrong forum. "We suggest that the appellant might better
seek the change it proposes in the legislative halls rather than this
court."8 0 This argument, which concerns with determining the

proper institution to make differing types of decision, was the
program of the Process School, to which we next turn.

76

Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, 158 N.W.2d 288 (Wis. 1968)

77

Id.

79

Id. at 291.
Id. at 290.

at

289.

78 Id.at 290.
80
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THE PROCESS SCHOOL

A Legal Process judge might have refused to
stay the eviction order because the landlord who did
not provide heat had violated the city housing code
rather than a rental agreement, and would therefore
have to be brought to court by the city housing
authority instead of by his tenant. . . . The
implication of Legal Process was that the law is a
separate, value-free institution, unconnected to
political and moral considerations-more like the
Constitution than like the Bill of Rights . . . [T]hat
was translated into approaching law in a rigorous,
unsentimental, analytical way-or, as it was often
put, "thinking like a lawyer." It's a shame about the
tenant's being on the street, a lawyer would think,
but what's important is the law. 81
The Process School, which developed during the late '40s
and the '50s, concentrated on the role and function of legal
institutions rather than the substantive law.
Its foremost
proponent was Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr. The first paragraph
of his article Foreword: The Time Chartof the Justices 82 lays out
his article's agenda:
This foreword departs from the pattern of
most of its predecessors by addressing itself not to
any especially noteworthy decisions or events of the
past term but rather to problems of the [Supreme]
Court's administration which are common to every
term - problems of the volume of the Court's
business and of the ways in which the business is
done. An effort will be made to picture these
problems as concretely as possible by trying to fit the
actual work which the [Supreme] Court does into the
time actually available for doing it. After that, a few
observations will be tendered about the conditions
of the Court's work and the relation of those
conditions to the number and quality of its
decisions.
81
82

Trillin, supra note 7, at 56.
Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L.

REV. 84, 84 (1959).
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The article estimated the available time the Justices of the
Supreme Court have to work and their total caseload. It then
divided the work into such categories as frivolous petitions, the
appellate docket, and argued cases and opinions. Professor Hart
drew some conclusions from his work/time analysis: written
arguments addressed to the Supreme Court must be brief and
well-organized, oral argument is critically important due to the
limited time available for each case's consideration, and the
Supreme Court's docket should not be expanded at all, in fact, it
should be materially decreased. Professor Hart then engaged in a
"laboratory analysis" of a recently published Supreme Court
opinion which he claimed was "inadequately reasoned" and served
to "provide a demonstration of [his] main thesis.., that the Court
would better serve its function, and actually relieve the pressure
on its docket, if it tried ... to write in those fewer cases betterreasoned opinions."8 3
Hart had selected Irvin v. Dow 8 4 as his example of the
Court's misfeasance. The article then spent many pages going into
the history of habeas corpus and Justice Brennan's majority
opinion, which ignored the history of the writ, but instead saw the
case as involving only the interpretation of the pertinent statute.
Professor Hart was not pleased and declared "To explicate in short
compass all that is wrong with this reasoning is not easy."8 5 He
then explained that the majority opinion was ambiguous, based on
an unexplained and inexplicable assertion, and full of technical
mistakes.
He saw the opinion as a judicial disaster and complained
"It provides a sufficient basis for the submission, herewith
earnestly made, that the American people are entitled to better
judging than this." 86 Hart proposed better time-management as
the solution, with more time available for "collective deliberation
and for private study of argued cases prior to such deliberation."8 7
The legal profession also must do better in its written and oral
831d. at 101.

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (here discussing a habeus corpus petition
contesting the petitioner's conviction and death sentence).
84

Hart, supranote 81, at 108.
at 122.
8
7Id. at 124. (Note that Hart's point is not that better time management would
make the Justices more productive, but that more time would produce better
decisions).
85

86 Id.
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arguments before the court and academics must focus on the
professional quality of the court's opinions. Hart explicitly argued
for a technical view of the law: the Supreme Court's job is not to
decide policy issues, to deal with values, or to make choices
between substantive legal interpretations, but to do a professional
job of interpreting case and statutory law, correctly following
precedent, and rendering clear, well-written decisions for the
guidance of lower courts. The Realists believed in the creative use
of precedent to realize social goals; Hart argued for the correct
and precise application of precedent. He concluded: "the time
must come when it is understood again, inside the profession as
well as outside, that reason is the life of the law and not just votes
88
for your side."
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES AND LAW AND ECONOMICS

We now come to two schools of jurisprudence which can be
characterized as descendants of Legal Realism. Like a standard
idea for a sitcom, one brother (the critical legal scholar) went to
art school, wears his hair long, and bemoans the establishment,
while the other (the Law and Economics scholar) earned his MBA,
has a closely-trimmed haircut, and tries to climb the
establishment hierarchy as high as he's able. Each brother, that is,
school vigorously maintains that it is the true heir of Legal
Realism.
Critical Legal Studies
Asked about the question of whether a landlord can
evict a tenant whose apartment has had no heat, a
Critical Legal Studies scholar might say the words
like "landlord" and tenant" are part of the
mystification process obscuring the right this society
gives to force some human beings out of their home.
Or he might say that that the real question is not the
way the decision goes but how its language adds to
the various
"belief clusters" that
permit
"hegemony"-the class domination that is so firmly
built into the culture and the language of a society
that the dominated accept it as necessary and
unchallengeable. He might even say that the legalservices lawyer who brought the case in the first
88

Id. at 125.
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place was simply helping to legitimate the system by
furthering the implication that the law is accessible
to all."8 9
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) grew out of Legal Realism. The
movement built on the Realists' attack on Formalism and took it
one step further. Like the Realists, the Critical Legal Scholars (the
"Crits") were and are leftist, reformist law teachers, hostile to
received legal wisdom.9o
The Crits believe that legal rules do not determine any
particular result: "[F]or any given rule, there were multiple,
contrasting and conflicting rules whose resolution required actors
to make choices. These choices were political ones that generally
reflected, supported, and legitimized the social power of dominant
classes."91 They, like the Legal Realists, maintain that even rules
innocuous or neutral at first glance involve making controversial
choices among competing policies.92
Professor Gordon describes the beginning of the movement
as one of uneasiness, of dissatisfaction with accepted doctrine:
"CLS is a movement mostly of law teachers, but also including
some practitioners, which started for most of us in the late 196os
or early 1970s out of a sense of extreme dissatisfaction with our
own legal education. We hoped to produce some work about law
that would try to make clear and convincing our felt uneasiness,
and work those inchoate feelings of dissatisfaction into a critique
with some cogency and content."93
My own view of Critical Legal Studies is the same as my
view of Legal Realism: it is futile to describe it as a coherent
doctrine. Rather, CLS, like Legal Realism, is a set of attitudes and
approaches to the law. As stated by Professor Gordon: "I should
first give fair warning that CLS is too heterogeneous, too divided
Trillin, supra note 7, at 70.
One commenter to this paper questioned the differences between Realism
and CLS. That difference is hard to define-it may be more attitudinal, with the
Crits being more cynical about the claims of the law and more hostile to the
dominant social structure than were the Realists.
91 Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and FutureDirectionsof Critical
Race Theory and Related Scholarship,84 DENY. U. L. REV. 329, 343 (2006).
92 Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: CriticalApproaches to Law,
89

90

15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195, 214 (1987).
93

Id. at 196-197.
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into conflicting schools and working methods, too well stocked
with mavericks and eccentrics, to have produced an orthodox
canon of 'correct' approaches."94
In the CLS set of ideas, one of the most important is
"hegemony," the idea that the distinctive and elaborate discourse
and body of knowledge of the law supports the hegemony of the
powers that be. CLS sets out to attack (in its own words, "trash")
the law's claim that it is based on rationality, consent (with a
minimum of necessary coercion), and efficiency; that any
necessary changes only consist of fine tuning a basically just,
practical, and necessary order.
Some characteristics of the CLS approach are as follows:
* Trashing - Demonstrating that an accepted rule of law is
contradictory and indeterminate.
* Attacking claims of "neutral principles of law."
* Maintaining that the legal doctrine embodies fundamental
contradictions in substance and purpose.95
* "Flipping" - Showing that an argument for one position
6
can equally well support its contrary.9
* Calling into question the accepted categories of the law,
such as public versus private, free contract versus
regulation, normal contracting versus the deviant/
exceptional.
Most of the above is negative - the mission is
deconstructive of received legal wisdom. But there is also a
positive program, a quest for justice and a better society. CLS,
however, does not articulate a theory of justice or what the good
society would be like. Richard Michael Fisch discusses the
negativity of CLS in his article, The Question that Killed Critical
Legal Studies, in which he meets an old friend who proclaims, "'It
was bound to fail, Michael,' . . . 'The problem with Critical Legal
Studies is that it didn't offer any positive program."'97 Fisch goes
94 Id. at 201.

Kennedy, supra note 74 (An example in Duncan Kennedy's argument that
contract law contains a fundamental conflict between selfishness and altruism).
96 Gordon, supra note 91, at 208 (e.g., Professor Gordon's argument that an
application of the strict traditional rules of contract would, far from being
necessary for business to function, actually stop commerce in its tracks).
97 Richard Michael Fischl, The Question that Killed CriticalLegal Studies, 17
95

LAW AND SOC. INQUIRY 779, 780 (1992).
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on to say, however, that such a criticism misses the point: it is
enough that CLS demonstrates the fallacies of orthodox legal
doctrine.98 Likewise, the conclusion of Gordon's Unfreezing
Legal Reality makes a modest, simply hopeful claim about the
Critical agenda:
If the resigned and complacent arguments turn out,
over and over again, to be wrong, it may be that after
all it is possible that altruism, community,
democratic participation, equality, and so forth, can
be promoted without destroying freedom and
economic efficiency. At the very least, there is
always the thrill of knowing that some of the fancier
rationalistic,
or resigned
and world-weary
arguments as to why nothing important can ever
change are no good.99
The Legal Realists were lucky in that the Great Depression
created a need for reform and opened a window for the realization
of new legal ideals. The Crits have had no such luck. John Henry
Schlegel writes, "Realism, unlike CLS, captured the state. The
Depression occurred while the Realists were active, and the
electoral triumph of Roosevelt's New Deal provided a receptive
outlet for Realist ideas about law and administrative government.
Thus, the politics that underlie Realism became a part of public
discourse, while the politics that underlie CLS remained

academic."100
The only CLS case I can think of - and this is a big stretch is ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,1° 1 in which Judge Easterbrook
upheld the validity of a shrink wrap agreement where the buyer's
options were to agree or return the software. Although, in CLS
language, it supports rather than undermines hegemony, it can be
seen as Critical Legal Studies case because Judge Easterbrook puts
the question in Crit terms between the software supplier and the
purchaser faced with the necessity of agreeing to the supplier's
terms or rejecting the software package, who has the power?
981d.
99 Gordon, supra note 91, at

220.

John Henry Schlegel, Drawing back from the Abyss, or Lessons Learned
from Count von Count 1CmT 16 (2OO8), available at http://www.thecritui
.com.
100

101 ProCD,

Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
HeinOnline -- 2 Crit 87 2009

"Must buyers of computer software obey the terms of shrinkwrap
licenses?"102
Few, if any, courts have adopted CLS as a way of making
decisions. But the law student can profit by being skeptical of the
claims of black-letter law to rationality and inevitability. Legal
arguments are made by pretending the legal analysis is mostly
value-free, but the student should realize that all court decisions
are at least partly political and hurt and help various interests.
Even in the Post-Realist age, legal education stresses the formal
aspects of the law and neglects the fact that law has real world
consequences.l0 3 Everyone in law should ponder the following:
"The point of Critical Legal studies is that the law is far better
understood as a significant aspect of the complex interplay
between our culture and structures of thought than it is something
that has some sort of 'room of its own.' We can't step outside of
law and look at it, we are looking at us."104 And a thought about
justice now and then is a good thing.
Children of CLS:
CLS has generated particularized schools of legal studies,
such as Critical Race Theory, Critical Race Feminism, and Latino
and Latina Critical Schools. These schools have built "upon the
themes and critical understandings of law exposed by the Critical
Legal Studies Movement."105 It also built on the insights of
feminism, dealing with power and the construction of social
rules.10 6 Critical Race Theory (CRT) began to separate itself from
CLS, questioning CLS as being white, male, and elite.107 Professor
Mutua lists the following as to what Critical Race Theory does:
* Holds that Racism is pervasive, rather than a deviation
from American norms.
* Rejects claims of meritocracy, neutrality, objectivity, and
color-blindness.
* Insists on contextual, historical analysis of law.

102
103

104
105
1o6

Id. at 1448.
Blum, supra note 12, at 74.
Fischl, supra note 96, at 786.
Mutua, supra note 9o, at 340.
Id. at 345.

Id. at 347 (one should note and appreciate the irony of criticism asserting
that CLS is elite and hierarchical!).
107

HeinOnline -- 2 Crit 88 2009

* Insists on recognition of experimental knowledge and the
critical consciousness of people of color in understanding
law and society.
* Exhibits interdisciplinary and eclectic thoughts.
* Works towards the liberation of people of color as it
embraces the larger project of liberating all oppressed
o8
people.1
Law and Economics
The Law and Economics people tend to think of the
law as social engineering-something that helps the
wheels go round-so their question about Skelly
Wright's decision on eviction might be what effect it
had on the housing market and the supply of
housing stock.l°9
The Law and Economics movement seeks to use the
principles of neoclassical economics to determine what is actually
happening in cases and to give a scientifically based guide to
decision making. In his textbook, Economic Analysis of Law,11°
Judge Posner describes economics as the use "of rational choice in a world - our world - in which resources are limited in relation
to human wants. The task of economics, so defined, is to explore
the implications of assuming that man is a rational maximizer of
his ends in life.""' The systematic application of economics to law
(outside of the antitrust field), the "new law and economics,"
started in 196o with the publication of two seminal articles by
Guido Calabresi and Ronald Coase. Since then, it has become a
major area of legal scholarship with a significant effect on judicial
opinions. In the words of Posner: the legal system is one "that
economic analysis can illuminate, reveal as coherent, and in places
improve.112 Moreover, economics can "be seen as a tool for
understanding and reforming social practices."113 In this, Law and
Economics follows the Realist program.

lO8
109

Id. at 353-54.
Trillin, supra note 7, at 76.

110 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th

ed.

1992).

111Id.
112

at 3.
Id. at xix.

Stanley Fish, Neoliberalism and HigherEducation,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8,
available at http://fish.blogs.nytimes.com, quoting in part Paul Treanor,
Neoliberalism: Origins, Theory, Definition, available at http://web.inter.nl.
113

2009,

HeinOnline -- 2 Crit 89 2009

The Law and Economics approach has been criticized by
many scholars on a variety of grounds. Since it is based on the
premises of the discipline of economics, one can attack it on the
basis that those premises are false.114
Law and Economics can be seen as a branch of the broader
movement of neoliberalism. Stanley Fish defines neoliberalism
and discusses it in his New York Times blog:
Here is an often cited definition by Paul
Treanor: "Neoliberalism is a philosophy in
which the existence and operation of a market
are valued in themselves, separately from any
previous relationship with the production of
goods and services
and where t1he
operation of a market or market-like
structure is seen as an ethic in itself capable
of acting as a guide for all human action, and
substituting for all previously existing ethical
beliefs."
In a neoliberal world, for example, tort
questions
questions of negligence law
are thought of not as ethical questions of
blame and restitution (who did the injury and
how can the injured party be made whole?),
but as economic questions about the value to
someone of an injury-producing action
relative to the cost to someone else adversely
affected by that same action ....
As Ronald Coase put it... "The question to be
decided is: is te value of the fish lost greater
or less than the value of the product which the
contamination of the stream makes possible?'"
[If closing my factory would be a more
significant economic loss, then] you allow my
factory to continue to pollute your stream and
I will compensate you or underwrite the costs
net/users/Paul.Treanor/neoliberalism.html and also R.H. Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (196o).
114 See Laurence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: CritiquingCritical
Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 466 (1987) ("Kennedy has argued that costbenefit analysis ... does not produce determinate results...")
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of your moving the stream elsewhere on your
property ....
Notice that "value" in this example (which is
an extremely simplified stand-in for infinitely
more complex transactions) is an economic,
not an ethical word, or, rather, that in the
neoliberal universe, ethics reduces to
calculations of wealth and productivity.
Notice too that if you and T proceed (as
market ethics dictate) to work things out
between us - to come to a private agreement
there will be no need for action by eithter
the government or thte courts ....
"
The solution is the privatization of everything
(hence thte slogan "let's get governments off
our backs"), which would include social
security, health care, K-12 education, the
ownership and maintenance of toll roads,
railways,
airlines,
energy
production,
communication systems and the flow of
money. (This list, far from exhaustive, should
alert -us to thie extent to whic the neoliberal
agenda has already succeeded.)
The assumption is that if free enterprise is
allowed to make its way into every corner of
human existence, the results will be better
overall for everyone, even for those who are
temporarily disadvantaged, let's say by being
deprived of their fish.n5
Seventh Circuit Judge (Richard Posner is the leader of the
Law and Economics school, and he lays out its program in the
chapter "The Economic Approach to Law" in his book The
6

Problemsof Jurisprudence.11

115

d.

116RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 353-62 (Harvard

University Press 199o). My use of his book's description of Law and Economics
is unfair, in that Judge Posner states his description is of "the most ambitious
effort" of Law and Economics, which he then goes on to critique, but his
admittedly exaggerated exposition serves as an exposition of the movement.
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Law and Economics assumes:
" All people are rational maximizers of their satisfactions.

* Legislation is a "deal" between interest groups.
* Courts interpret and apply these "deals" and provide the
authoritative dispute resolution.
* The common law exhibits a remarkable consistency in
working towards "wealth maximization" and economic
efficiency.
* The common law (and here is the prescriptive component)
should maximize society's wealth.117
* The common law can be reduced to a handful of economic
formulas. A few principles such as cost-benefit analysis,
the prevention of free riding, decision under uncertainty,
and the promotion of mutually beneficial exchanges, can
explain most doctrines and decisions.
* Law and Economics differs from Classical Legal Thought in
that Law and Economics is empirically verifiable. The
ultimate test of a rule derived from economic theory is not
the rule's elegance, logic, or derivation, but its effect on
social wealth. Here, Law and Economics follows Legal
Realism's emphasis on pragmatic results. The Classical
Legal Theory preferred a Formalist interpretation of
contracts because such an approach was inherent in the
nature of what contract law was; Law and Economics may
prefer a Formalist approach to contracts because it
l8
pragmatically maximizes welfare."
Law and Economics opinions are often written by Judge
Richard Posner and Judge Frank Easterbrook (both judges on of
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and Senior Lecturers at the
University of Chicago Law School). A good example is Walgreen
Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co.,119 which involved a mall tenant
(Walgreen) suing the mall owner (Sara Creek) for an order
enjoining the owner from renting to a competing pharmacy in
violation of the lease. Judge Posner affirmed the granting of the
117Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 8o,
813 (1991) (Law and Economics often just assumes that the goal of law is to
promote economic efficiency and wealth maximization without discussion).
118 See Robert E. Scott, The Casefor Formalismin RelationalContract,94 Nw.
U. L. REV. 847, 876 (2000).
119Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co., 966 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1992).
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injunction, using a cost/benefit analysis to compare the merits of
money damages and an injunction. While the injunctive remedy
would cause the parties to negotiate, an award of damages would
require the court or jury to determine the amount of those
damages; Judge Posner reasoned "a premise of our free market
system, and the lesson of experience here and abroad as well, is
that prices and costs are more accurately determined by the
market than by government." On the cost side, injunctions
require court supervision. Posner then uses economic theory to
describe the "bilateral monopoly," in which two parties can deal
only with each other: The lack of alternatives in bilateral
monopoly creates a bargaining range, and the cost of negotiations
to a point within that range may be high."120 A damages remedy,
on the other hand, would avoid the costs mentioned above, but
would be less accurate and require the expenditure of additional
resources both by the parties in the presentation of evidence and
also by the court in reaching its decision. Posner thus concludes
that the weighing of these costs and benefits is the job of the
district court judge and "as long as we are satisfied that his
approach is broadly consistent with a proper analysis we shall
affirm."121
NEO-TEXTUALISM

There has been a reaction to, or a counter-revolution
against, the Legal Realist's emphasis on context over statutory and
contract language. There is a further divergence between the
academic reaction, which is based on policy and sophisticated
conceptual arguments, and that of several judges, whose opinions
evidence the attitude that words have plain meaning and that
academic theories to the contrary are just so much hot air.
There is much more legal literature on statutory and
constitutional interpretation than on contractual interpretation.
Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook are in the vanguard of those
who argue that a judge should only look to the text of the statute.
Easterbrook, although dismissing the concept of "plain meaning"
as silly, states that the costs of error in interpretation are
minimized if judges engage in a relatively unimaginative,
mechanical process of interpretation. Both he and Scalia reject the
concept of legislative intent as a useless fiction. Focusing on
12 Id. at 275-6.
121 Id. at 277.
HeinOnline -- 2 Crit 93 2009

legislative policies equates meaning with election returns. Judges
are not linguistic philosophers who can successfully make
nuanced arguments, but overburdened generalists.122
Some
academics also argue that a textual approach to contract
interpretation with a vigorous and expansive enforcement of the
parol evidence rule is justified on cost-benefit grounds. Robert E.
Scott, in one of his many articles arguing in favor of formalism,
states: "Formalist modes of interpretation are justified because,
and only because, they offer the best prospect for maximizing the
value of contractual relations... ."123
But over and above any policy argument, there is the fear
that any other way of reading contractual or statutory language
will only lead to chaos. Stanley Fish gives a great description of
the textualist position:
"In that theory communication is
anchored by something variously called literal language, neutral
language, objective language, plain language, scientific language,
denotative language, explicit language, etc. By any name, what is
referred to is a level of language immune from contextual
variation and therefore resistant to interpretation."124
Any approach other than plain meaning produces chaos:
On the one side, the independent power of selfconstruing language; on the other, the power generated by
the artful distortions of interested agents. If the power of
interest is allowed to obscure matters of fact, if the
determination of fact turns into a contest of persuasive
styles, then the notion of a contract - of an agreement
sealed by its verbal representation - goes by the boards;
and if that happens, general disaster - the wholesale
breakdown of communicative certainty and trust - cannot
be far behind.125
Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation,17 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 61 (1994).
123 Scott, supra note 117, at 875.
122

124

STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE

(1989) (Fish totally
disagrees with the textualist position).
125 Id. at 507. Judge Alex Kozinski, of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, sees
himself as part of the defense against a radical takeover of the law. J. Alex
Kozinski, Bending the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, § 7. See also, Dana
Roithmayr, Guerillas in OurMidst: The Assault on Radicals in American Law,
96 MICH. L. REv. 1658 (1998).
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The opinions issued in W.W.W. Associates v. Giancontieri126 and
Trident Ctr. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.127 both illustrate the
reaction against Legal Realistic contract interpretation.
In
W.W.W. Associates, the court applied the parol evidence rule in
rejecting the use of extrinsic evidence to interpret a cancellation
clause as limited to the purchaser alone, because the clause made
no mention of such a limitation. The court reaffirmed the oldfashioned parol evidence rule in all its glory: "A familiar and
eminently sensible proposition of law is that, when parties set
down their agreement in a clean, complete document, their
writing should be enforced according to its terms. Evidence
outside the four corners of the document as to what was really
intended but unstated or misstated is generally inadmissible to
add to or vary the writing."12 8 Nor could extrinsic evidence be

admitted to create an ambiguity: "It is well settled that 'extrinsic
and parol evidence is not admissible to create an ambiguity in a
written agreement which is complete and clear and unambiguous
on its face."'129
In Trident, the borrower maintained that under the
contract, it had the right to prepay at any time, subject to a fee.
The court thought such a reading plainly contradicted the clear
meaning of the contract. But bound by the Erie doctrine, it
followed Judge Rodger Traynor's rejection of plain meaning rule,
expressed in Pacific Gas, and remanded the case so that extrinsic
evidence could be considered. It did so only under protest, stating
that any interpretative method other than plain meaning is not
only wrong, but will lead to anarchy:
While this rule creates much business for lawyers and an
occasional windfall to some clients, it leads only to
frustration and delay for most litigants and clogs already
overburdened courts. It also chips away at the foundation
of our legal system. By giving credence to the idea that
words are inadequate to express concepts, Pacific Gas
undermines the basic principle that language provides a
meaningful constraint on public and private conduct.130
126 W.W.W. Assoc., Inc. v. Giancontieri 77 N.Y.2d 157 (N.Y. 199o).
127 Trident Ctr. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988).
128 W.W.W. Assoc., Inc. v. Giancontieri 77 N.Y.2d at 162.
129 Intercontinental Planning Ltd. v Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 372, 379 (N.Y.
1969); See also Chimart Assoc. v Paul, 66 N.Y. 2d 570, 573 (N.Y. 1986).
130

Id. at 569.
HeinOnline -- 2 Crit 95 2009

Thus, even though the contract was clear, California law had
"turned its back on the notion that a contract can ever have a plain
meaning discernible by a court without resort to extrinsic
evidence... If one side is willing to claim that the parties intended
one thing but the agreement provides for another, the court must
consider extrinsic evidence of possible ambiguity."131
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY

Feminist Legal theory has many branches, but two themes
seem basic: 1) society is dominated by patriarchy, and 2) society
subordinates women to men. Feminist Legal Scholars use these
basic insights to develop a feminist-based critique of law.132
Feminist Legal theory has been successful in changing the law, for
example, passing the Equal Pay for Equal Work Act.
There are many sub-schools of Feminist Legal Theory;
some of them are described below.133
* Those concerned with substantive equity look to the results
of seemingly neutral rules. Equal treatment often leads to
unequal results because of the difference between men and
women. This approach argues for laws such as those
allowing for pregnancy leave.134
* Nonsubordination Theory considers whether a legal
practice supports the subordination of women. 135
* The "Dominance" approach or "Radical Femin-ism,"136 first
developed by Catherine McKinnon, contributed to the
inclusion of sexual harassment within the scope of
prohibited sexual discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.137
* Different Voice Theory sees men and women as having
different values and ways of thinking; men see law and
society in terms of legal rights, women in terms of an
Ctr. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d at 568-9.
GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT
CENTURY'S END 128 (New York University Press 1996).
133 The following is taken mostly from Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender Law, 1
DuIcE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1 (1994).
134 Id. at 2-4.
135 Id. at 4-6.
136 MINDA, supra note 131, at 137.
137 Bartlett, supra note 132, at 7; Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986).
131 Trident
132
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"ethics of care." This approach seeks laws that reflect
8
women's consciousness.13
CONCLUSION

Looking back at this essay, it seems that the schools of
jurisprudence fall into a division between the formalists, who see
law as a logical system and interpret documents (constitutions,
laws, and contracts) in terms of the text itself, and the realists,
who see law in the context of social reality and policy. We can see
this division neatly illustrated in Burnham, in which Scalia wants
to apply the Formal "rule of presence" in determining personal
jurisdiction, while Brennan wishes to use InternationalShoe and
Shaffer's "minimum contacts standard," based on policy and
fairness.139
This division may be a basic human one, similar to that
between conservatives and liberals in politics or between
classicists and baroque/romantics in art.
Certainly, no
jurisprudential school is permanently out of fashion, but rather
each is recurrently revived and cycled back into prominence. As
Stanley Fish states, "the law does not wish to be absorbed by, or
declared subordinate to, some other-nonlegal-structure of
concern; the law wishes, in a word, to be distinct, not something
else." Formalism satisfies this need and defends against law's
absorption into morality and policy.140 But law divorced from
reality and ends seems absurd. Jurisprudence is not static-legal
thinkers are always creating new systems, seeking acceptance for
their ideas, and attacking older doctrines. I hope that this essay
will be not only helpful to the reader in the study of law, but that it
also demonstrates that law and its study are not a matter of the
boring memorization of black letter law (although there is some of
that), but exciting intellectual endeavors that directly affect how
our society functions.

Bartlett, supra note 122 at 11-12.
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977).
140 FISH, supra note 71, at 166-67.
138
139
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